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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution clearly prohibit 
unreasonable searches and seizures.1 In light of what can be found 
in a person’s blood with today’s technology, defining what 
constitutes an unreasonable search or unreasonable seizure in 
biological sample extraction has become a challenge. Particularly, 
medical and personal information is becoming increasingly 
discoverable. Such discoverability has caused federal and state courts 
to pause and consider what this means for an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
2
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This Note first describes the history of United States law and 
Minnesota law on blood draw testing.2 This Note goes on to describe 
Minnesota’s current search and seizure limitations—namely the 
Particularity Clause and guidelines for warrant interpretation.3 Next, 
this Note explains the facts and procedural history, the majority 
discussion and decision, and the dissenting opinions of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court case State v. Fawcett.4 This Note then 
analyzes the majority’s two main assertions: 
(1) the testing of a blood draw is a search; and 
(2) a warrant for a blood draw must particularly describe how 
the blood will be tested. 
This Note argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
characterization of a blood draw as a search is proper.5 This Note 
also argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court erred because the 
warrant at issue did not particularly describe the search of Fawcett’s 
blood for alcohol and drugs.6 This Note concludes by describing how 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Fawcett (1) sheds light 
on how cases around the United States may be decided after the 
recent United States Supreme Court Birchfield decision, and (2) sets 
new precedent in Minnesota.7 
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A. Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Law in Relation to Blood 
Draws and Analysis 
1. Minnesota Adopted the United States Supreme Court’s Definitions
of “Seizure” and “Search”
The Minnesota Supreme Court has agreed with the United 
States Supreme Court that a seizure has occurred “if in view of all of 
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he or she was neither free to disregard the 
police questions nor free to terminate the encounter.”8 The 
2. See infra Section II.A.
3. See infra Section II.B.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Section IV.A.
6. See infra Section IV.B.
7. See infra Part V.
8. State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995) (internal citations
omitted). 
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Minnesota Supreme Court has also agreed with the United States 
Supreme Court that “[a] search occurs when an expectation of 
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”9 
2. In 1966, the United States Supreme Court Classified a Blood
Draw as a Seizure and Blood Draw Testing as a Search in
Schmerber
In the 1966 case Schmerber v. California,10 the United States 
Supreme Court classified the administration of a blood test as both 
the seizure of a person and the subsequent search of that person.11 
The Court reasoned that since a blood draw requires piercing the 
skin, a blood draw is extremely personal.12 The Court analogized that 
just as search warrants are required for intrusions into the extremely 
9. Harrison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn. Ct. App.
2010) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984)); see also State v. 
Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 860 (Minn. 2006) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967)) (explaining that constitutional protections in Minnesota are not 
considered until a person has “expectations of privacy that ‘society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable’”). 
10. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
11. Id. at 767 (“It could not reasonably be argued . . . that the administration
of the blood test in this case was free of the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. 
Such testing procedures plainly constitute searches of ‘persons,’ and depend 
antecedently upon seizures of ‘persons,’ within the meaning of that Amendment.”). 
The Court in Schmerber does not clearly define what it means by “blood test.” The 
phrase “administration of a blood test” indicates the Court may have been referring 
only to the blood draw when using the term “blood test.” This interpretation is 
supported by the case’s issue statement: “The question is squarely presented 
therefore, whether the chemical analysis introduced in evidence in this case should 
have been excluded as the product of an unconstitutional search and seizure.” Id. 
at 766–67. The way in which the Court identifies in this statement that the “chemical 
analysis” is the product of a “search and seizure” indicates three events: (1) “seizure” 
of the person, (2) “search” in the form of a blood draw, and (3) chemical analysis 
of the blood. Schmerber concluded that there was only one seizure and only one 
search because the issue of three potential Fourth Amendment events was not 
before it; the defense did not attempt to distinguish between the blood draw and 
the chemical analysis of the blood and to name the latter as a “search.” Andrei 
Nedelcu, Blood and Privacy: Towards a “Testing-as-Search” Paradigm Under the Fourth 
Amendment, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 195, 198–99 (2015). 
12. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769–70 (“Whatever the validity of these
considerations in general, they have little applicability with respect to searches 
involving intrusions beyond the body’s surface. The interests in human dignity and 
privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the 
mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.”). 
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personal place of a person’s dwelling, search warrants should also be 
required for intrusions into the extremely personal place of a 
person’s body.13 
Nevertheless, the Schmerber Court also recognized an exception 
to the warrant requirement in emergency situations.14 The Court 
held that results of the blood test in Schmerber were admissible under 
this exception to the warrant requirement because the situation 
constituted an emergency.15 In Schmerber, the petitioner refused to 
submit to a breathalyzer test, and evidence of alcohol usage was 
quickly dissipating into the petitioner’s blood stream.16 If the police 
had not taken the petitioner’s blood at that moment, the Court 
reasoned, the evidence could have been permanently lost.17 
3. In 1988, the Ninth Circuit Interpreted Schmerber’s Search and
Seizure Classifications as One Fourth Amendment Event in
Snyder
Later courts have remarked that when the United States 
Supreme Court in Schmerber classified a blood draw as seizure and the 
blood draw’s testing as a search, the Court meant that both the 
seizure and the search happened within one distinct Fourth 
Amendment event.18 In United States v. Snyder, a 1988 Ninth Circuit 
case,19 the defendant was suspected of driving under the influence 
of intoxicants (“DUI”).20 The defendant tried to use the Schmerber 
opinion to convince the court that a warrantless, emergency seizure 
of a person’s blood in the form of a blood draw and the subsequent 
search of that blood in the form of chemical analysis were distinct 
Fourth Amendment events.21 The defendant explained that after a 
person’s blood is drawn, the sample retains whatever alcohol content 
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 771.
16. Id. at 770–71. Similar to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in
Schmerber that a warrant is not required for a blood draw due to the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, a majority of states, including 
Minnesota, have also ruled that an arrest is not necessary prior to the taking of a 
blood draw. FLEM K. WHITED III, DRINKING/DRIVING LITIGATION: CRIMINAL AND CIVIL 
§ 7:4 (2d ed. 2016).
17. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–71.
18. See infra note 28.
19. 852 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1988).
20. Id. at 472.
21. Id. at 473.
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was in it at the time of the draw.22 The defendant concluded that 
since his seized blood retained the alcohol level it had at the time of 
the accident, the emergency exception to the warrant requirement 
discussed in Schmerber did not apply to his case.23 Thus, a warrant was 
needed to have chemically analyzed the defendant’s blood.24 
The Ninth Circuit decided that the defendant’s line of 
reasoning was “too much” because it broke up the DUI incident into 
too many independent Fourth Amendment events.25 The court 
asserted that Schmerber had established that the events of the arrest, 
the blood draw, and the blood’s testing were indivisible in the eyes 
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (“[Defendant] points out, however, that the exigency justifying
extraction of blood is eliminated once the blood is removed from the suspect’s 
body, because any traces of alcohol in the extracted blood will be preserved 
indefinitely.”). 
25. Id. The Snyder court summarized the defendant’s argument as such: “He
would have us hold that his person was seized when he was arrested, his blood was 
seized again upon extraction at the hospital, and finally his blood was searched two 
days later when the blood test was conducted.” Id. Note that in so characterizing the 
defendant’s argument, the Ninth Circuit identifies one more potential Fourth 
Amendment event that the Schmerber Court did not identify: the seizure of blood, 
which is distinct from the seizure of the person. Snyder’s seizure-seizure-search 
formulation, where the blood draw is the second seizure, is distinct from the 
Supreme Court’s seizure-search-[possible second search] formulation in Schmerber, 
where the blood draw is the first search. See supra note 11. In characterizing the 
blood draw as a “seizure” instead of a “search,” the Ninth Circuit in Snyder 
inadvertently introduced the idea of four possible distinct Fourth Amendment 
events in the process of a DUI conviction when combined with Schmerber’s two (and 
possibly three) Fourth Amendment events. See id. These four possible Fourth 
Amendments are: (1) seizure of the person, (2) search of the person through the 
blood draw, (3) seizure of the blood through the blood draw, and, possibly, (4) 
analysis of the blood. The Supreme Court in Schmerber only addressed events (1) and 
(2), ignoring (4) because the defendant failed to distinguish (4) from (2). Nedelcu, 
supra note 11, at 198. The Ninth Circuit in Snyder only addressed events (1), (3), 
and (4), although they spent little time on (3), seizure of the blood through the 
blood draw. Part of Snyder’s error, then, is in misunderstanding the Supreme Court’s 
use of the term “blood test” in Schmerber to infer that the Court had already 
concluded that (4) analysis of the blood is a search. In reality, however, the Supreme 
Court’s use of the term “blood test” in Schmerber was to establish that (2) the blood 
draw was a search (a search that possibly encompassed (4) analysis of the blood). 
Although there is uncertainty about how much the Supreme Court meant to 
connect (2) the blood draw and (4) analysis of the blood with its use of the term 
“blood test,” it had not concluded at that time whether (4) analysis of the blood is 
a search that stands apart from (2) the blood draw. See id. 
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of the Fourth Amendment.26 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded, Schmerber must be interpreted in a way that classifies the 
seizure of a person, the seizure of his blood, and the subsequent 
search of that blood as one distinct Fourth Amendment event.27 
26. Snyder, 852 F.2d at 474. The proof the Ninth Circuit offered in support of
its interpretation that the Schmerber Court meant for the DUI incident to be one 
indivisible Fourth Amendment event is this quote from Schmerber: “The questions we 
must decide in this case are whether the police were justified in requiring petitioner 
to submit to the blood test, and whether the means and procedures employed in 
taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of 
reasonableness.” Id. at 474 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 
(1966)). The Snyder court did not specifically explain how this quote supports its 
conclusion that the Supreme Court in Schmerber saw the blood draw and the blood 
test as two events that are indivisible in the eyes of the Fourth Amendment. 
However, the Snyder court reasoned that since the only justification for the blood 
draw in Schmerber was to seize evidence of alcohol content, the right to search the 
blood was assumed when the right to seize the blood was attained. Id. 
27. Id. at 473–74. (“It seems clear, however, that Schmerber viewed the seizure
and separate search of the blood as a single event for fourth amendment 
purposes.”). The interpretation in Snyder and later courts believe the Schmerber 
Court’s adoption of joining the seizure and search of the process of a blood draw 
into one inseparable Fourth Amendment event has been challenged by the 
emergence of new DNA collection methods. See Justin A. Alfano, Look What Katz 
Leaves Out: Why DNA Collection Challenges the Scope of the Fourth Amendment, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1017, 1030 (2005). Many modern DNA extraction techniques 
require significantly less intrusion into the human body than a blood draw requires. 
Id. at 1030–31. The Supreme Court has ruled that the testing of DNA obtained by 
such a minimal intrusion as a buccal swab is still a search. Maryland v. King, 133 S. 
Ct. 1958, 1968–69 (2013). Unless the Supreme Court finds that there exists a less 
intrusive DNA sampling technique than the taking of a buccal swab, it can be 
inferred that all bodily intrusions used to take DNA samples are considered searches 
regardless of the level of seizure preceding the search. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 
SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.6(a) (5th ed. 2016). Furthermore, DNA testing techniques are 
already so advanced that DNA can be taken from “abandoned samples”—everyday 
items like disposable cups on which suspects have left saliva or other DNA-carrying 
fluids. Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 
76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 436 (2001). If testing an abandoned and unseized biological 
sample was still to be considered a “search,” this would, by definition, require that 
there was some sort of intrusion other than intrusion into a person’s body. One such 
intrusion that would make the testing of an unseized biological sample a search 
would be the test’s intrusion into an expectation of privacy regarding “private 
medical facts” that can be found in DNA. D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA 
Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 481–82 (2001) (quoting 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)). When such testing 
intrudes on an expectation of privacy regarding “private medical facts,” the testing 
is a search that does not need to be connected to an antecedent seizure and 
intrusion into a person’s body. D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification 
7
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However, the Ninth Circuit in Snyder did not go so far as to say that 
the testing of the blood sample was not a search.28 
4. State Courts Went Beyond Snyder and Said Blood Tests Are Not
Searches
Many state courts not only adopted the Ninth Circuit’s Snyder 
interpretation of Schmerber—that exigent-circumstance DUI blood 
draws and analysis constitute one Fourth Amendment event—but 
also went beyond the Snyder decision by saying that this Fourth 
Amendment event terminates when the blood is drawn and that the 
individual loses all expectation of privacy in a blood sample once his 
or her blood is seized.29 The state courts’ holdings that there is no 
Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. 
REV. 413, 444 (2003) (“[T]he sensitive nature of some of the information locked in 
the helices of the DNA molecule leads us to believe that DNA sampling is a Fourth 
Amendment search, even if the sample is obtained noninvasively.”). 
28. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “under Schmerber, so long as blood is
extracted incident to a valid arrest based on probable cause to believe that the 
suspect was driving under the influence of alcohol, the subsequent performance of 
a blood-alcohol test has no independent significance for fourth amendment 
purposes.” Snyder, 852 F.2d at 474. A footnote clarifies this statement as follows: 
“This assumes, of course, that ‘the test chosen to measure [the defendant’s] blood-
alcohol level was a reasonable one’ and ‘was performed in a reasonable manner’ 
under Schmerber.” Id. at 474 n.2 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771). This footnote’s 
discussion of “reasonableness” in regard to the blood’s testing indicates the Ninth 
Circuit still considered blood testing to be a search, just not a search that is an 
independent Fourth Amendment event in relation to the blood draw. 
29. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 2001) (holding that the
defendant had an expectation of privacy in his blood sample until his blood was 
drawn, as the Fourth Amendment event terminated after the draw and no new 
seizures or searches subsequently occurred); Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250, 1272 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (“Any legitimate expectation of privacy that the appellant 
had in his blood disappeared when that blood was validly seized.”); People v. King, 
663 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (1997) (“Privacy concerns are no longer relevant once the 
sample has already lawfully been removed from the body, and the scientific analysis 
of a sample does not involve any further search and seizure of a defendant’s 
person.”); State v. Barkley, 551 S.E.2d 131, 135 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (“Once the 
blood was lawfully drawn from defendant’s body, he no longer had a possessory 
interest in that blood.”); State v. Sanders, Nos. 93-2284-CR, 93-2286-CR, 1994 WL 
481723, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1994) (“We agree with the trial court that, once 
the police came into lawful possession of the blood samples, Sanders lost any 
expectation of privacy he may have had in them, at least insofar as testing for 
intoxicants—whether alcohol or drug—related-is concerned.”); see also State v. 
Hauge, 79 P.3d 131, 144 (Haw. 2003) (“[A] number of jurisdictions have held on 
analogous facts that once a blood sample and a DNA profile is lawfully procured 
8
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expectation of privacy in a blood sample implies that testing a blood 
sample is not a search; the definition of “search” requires the 
infringement of an expectation of privacy.30 
Many states agree that the analysis of blood is not a search in 
exigent-circumstances DUI cases, and this is in contrast to the 
general rule that the “collection and analysis of biological samples” 
is a search.31 The reason for this anomaly may be largely policy-
based—if courts freely admit that an exigent-circumstances DUI 
blood draw and analysis is a search, and if the blood’s analysis can be 
identified as a search that is separate from the search of the blood 
draw, it follows that a warrant would be required for that analysis. 
This is the very argument the appellant in Schmerber made to no 
from a defendant, no privacy interest persists in either the sample or the profile.”); 
State v. VanLaarhoven, 637 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (“Snyder teach[es] 
that the examination of evidence . . . is an essential part of the seizure and does not 
require a judicially authorized warrant. [Snyder] refuse[s] to permit a defendant to 
parse the lawful seizure of a blood sample into multiple components.”); Nedelcu, 
supra note 11, at 201 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.10(e) (5th ed. 2013)) (“[N]ational search and seizure 
jurisprudence is largely in agreement: No express judicial authorization is needed 
to analyze a suspect’s blood . . . once it has already been lawfully procured.”). 
30. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“A ‘search’ occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is 
infringed.”). 
31. See State v. Surge, 94 P.3d 345, 347 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (observing that
“[c]ourts generally agree that the collection and analysis of biological samples from 
an individual constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment”), aff’d, 
156 P.3d 208 (Wash. 2007). Many state courts have found blood sample analysis not 
to be a search in DUI cases mainly due to the fact that before Birchfield v. North 
Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), blood draws were often taken when probable cause 
and the exigent circumstances justification for a warrantless search existed. The 
justification of exigent circumstances was used because the evidence of substances 
in the bloodstream dissipates if the blood draw is not conducted quickly. Evidence 
obtained with probable cause and in exigent circumstances, taken and tested for 
existence of evidence of a crime, is admissible. See, e.g., State v. Aguirre, 295 N.W.2d 
79, 81 (Minn. 1980). Thus, it seems that pre-Birchfield courts were more willing to 
acknowledge that non-blood draw biological-sample extraction techniques were 
searches because the collection and analysis of such samples was not time-sensitive. 
Pre-Birchfield courts were less willing to acknowledge that blood draws were searches 
because the collection and analysis of such samples is time-sensitive, and excessive 
warrant requirements in a society that was not as technologically advanced as it is 
today could easily result in evidence being lost in that short amount of time. See 
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2192–93 (describing recent technological advances that make 
requesting and issuing warrants more expeditious). 
9
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avail.32 Such a requirement would certainly burden police and 
judges with what states may see as a frivolous need to justify testing 
of samples that are already in the authorities’ hands. 
Minnesota does not classify the testing of a lawfully obtained 
blood sample as a search. In the 2010 Minnesota Court of Appeals 
case Harrison v. Commissioner of Public Safety,33 the defendant 
paralleled the argument made by the defendant in Snyder over two 
decades earlier.34 The defendant in Harrison consented to blood 
testing in two separate instances of DUI arrests.35 He argued that the 
drawing of his blood and the subsequent testing of his blood sample 
were two distinct Fourth Amendment events.36 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals interpreted Schmerber as 
establishing that the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement applied to the blood’s analysis for alcohol content, not 
just to the blood draw.37 Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Snyder, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Harrison rejected the 
defendant’s reasoning that the drawing of blood and the testing of 
blood are two independent Fourth Amendment events.38 
Moreover, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Harrison adopted 
the reasoning of a later Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. 
32. Snyder, 852 F.2d at 473.
33. Harrison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn. Ct. App.
2010). 
34. See Snyder, 852 F.2d at 472–73.
35. Harrison, 781 N.W.2d at 919.
36. Id. at 921.
37. Id. at 920 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966))
(“[T]he United States Supreme Court . . . [has] recognized the validity of the 
application of the exigent-circumstances exception to alcohol testing for impaired 
driving.”). The Minnesota Court of Appeals identified that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court came to the same conclusion in State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 549–50 
(Minn. 2008). Harrison, 781 N.W.2d at 920. However, the reasoning of both 
Schmerber and Shriner that Harrison highlights justifies the drawing of a blood sample, 
not the searching of such a sample. In citing Schmerber, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals points to this language: “[T]he delay necessary to obtain a warrant . . . 
threaten[s] the destruction of evidence.” Id. (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770). In 
citing Shriner, the Minnesota Court of Appeals points to this language: “[The] rapid, 
natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood creates single-factor exigent 
circumstances that will justify the police taking a warrantless, nonconsensual blood 
draw from a defendant, provided that the police have probable cause to believe that 
defendant committed criminal vehicular homicide or operation.” Id. (quoting 
Shriner, 751 N.W.2d at 549–50). 
38. Id. at 921.
10
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Kincade.39 In Kincade, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning went beyond 
Snyder’s interpretation of Schmerber and resembled the positions of 
other state courts. Harrison, relying on Kincade, specified that the 
defendant lost all “legitimate” expectations of privacy in his blood 
sample40 once the blood was drawn and that, accordingly, the testing 
of the defendant’s blood was not a search at all.41 The Minnesota 
Court of Appeals’ decision in Harrison never addressed the question 
of whether the blood draw and the blood’s subsequent testing was 
part of one or two Fourth Amendment events; it simply found that 
the blood testing had no Fourth Amendment significance 
whatsoever.42 
39. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
40. Harrison, 781 N.W.2d at 921 (citing Kincade, 379 F.3d at 837) (“We
conclude that when the state has lawfully obtained a sample of a person’s blood 
under the implied-consent law, specifically for the purpose of determining alcohol 
concentration, the person has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
alcohol concentration derived from analysis of the sample.”). Harrison’s reliance on 
Kincade is misplaced for two reasons. First, Kincade was not a case in which the 
defendant’s blood draw was justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances; 
Kincade involved the blood draw of conditionally released federal offenders under 
a “special need” analysis. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 832. Therefore, the Kincade court 
was not faced with the task of evaluating the role of policy considerations related to 
exigent circumstances. Second, in Kincade the Ninth Circuit specifically stressed, 
“Let us be clear: Our holding in no way intimates that conditional releasees’ 
diminished expectations of privacy serve to extinguish their ability to invoke the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.” Id. at 835. This direct statement makes clear that a releasee has 
“diminished” (as opposed to nonexistent) expectations of privacy. See id. The 
releasee is still able to invoke Fourth Amendment protections despite the fact that 
the releasee is convicted. On the other hand, the defendant in Harrison was on trial 
for his drunk driving charge but had not been convicted. Thus, the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals’ reliance on Kincade in Harrison was misplaced. The court lacked 
foundation for its assertion that someone who is not convicted and whose blood was 
lawfully obtained under implied-consent law, for the purpose of determining 
alcohol concentration, has no “legitimate” expectation of privacy in the results of 
the alcohol analysis. 
41. Harrison, 781 N.W.2d at 921 (“A search occurs when an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed . . . . Harrison 
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the alcohol concentration derived from 
analysis of his lawfully-obtained blood sample.”). The court, generalizing this 
principle, announced, “Absent such a privacy interest, any testing of the blood 
sample for its alcohol concentration is not a search that implicates constitutional 
protection.” Id. 
42. By not addressing all the potential Fourth Amendment events that had
occurred in the facts of the case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ ruling in Harrison 
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5. The United States Supreme Court Continues to Protect Privacy
Expectations in Blood Samples
Despite a massive number of state cases holding that individuals 
lose all expectations of privacy once their blood is drawn and that 
the Fourth Amendment event terminates at that moment, the 
United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that at 
least part of an individual’s expectation of privacy extends beyond 
the blood draw. First, in the 1989 case Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n,43 decided shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s Snyder 
decision, the Supreme Court held that analysis of a biological sample 
is a “further invasion”44 of the privacy interests of one who has 
already been subjected to the government’s compelled intrusion 
into his or her body.45 The Court explained the extent of the 
differed from the assertion of many state courts. Using Schmerber, those courts held 
that the blood draw and blood testing are part of one Fourth Amendment event. See 
supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
43. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
44. Id. at 616. The Court’s use of the phrase “further invasion” in Skinner is the
extent to which the Supreme Court had until that time, and even for years after, 
attempted to describe the relationship between the taking of a biological sample 
and the biological sample’s analysis. Leigh M. Harlan, When Privacy Fails: Invoking a 
Property Paradigm to Mandate the Destruction of DNA Samples, 54 DUKE L.J. 179, 192 
(2004). The Court never elaborated on what it really meant by “further invasion.” 
See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616–17. This lack of specificity makes tracking the number 
of Fourth Amendment events in a DUI case during the Schmerber and Skinnner era 
difficult and a matter of some conjecture. 
45. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616–17 (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25
(1987)). In Hicks, police raided a suspect’s apartment without a warrant in order to 
find weapons, victims, and the possible shooter related to a bullet discharged from 
the apartment. Id. at 321. When the police saw a stereo that they believed may have 
been stolen, they moved some items around the stereo in order to access the stereo’s 
serial number. Id. The Court held that the moving of these items did not constitute 
a seizure because it did not “meaningfully interfere” with the respondent’s 
possessory interests. Id. However, the Court held that the moving of the items was a 
separate search because it was an invasion of the respondent’s privacy that was 
“unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry.” Id. at 325. Since 
the police did not have a warrant for such a search, the Court affirmed the exclusion 
of incriminating evidence found in the course of this unconstitutional search. Id. at 
329. Given that the Court suppressed evidence in Hicks, the Skinner Court’s reliance 
on Hicks to demonstrate what a “further invasion” looks like seems odd because the 
Court did not suppress evidence in Skinner. Had the Skinner Court completed its 
analogy to Hicks, it would have found that the “further invasion” of a blood sample’s 
analysis caused the results to be inadmissible, just as the “further invasion” in Hicks 
of police moving items in order to access a stereo’s serial number caused evidence 
12
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invasion by noting that chemical testing of blood undisputedly “can 
reveal a host of private medical facts.”46 The Court ultimately found 
that the “further invasion” of chemical analysis of a biological sample 
is not an unreasonable search.47 Nevertheless, it is significant that 
the Court considered the “further invasion” of chemical analysis to 
be a “search” that is subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny and 
distinct from the search implicated in the taking of the biological 
sample.48 
Much more recently, in the 2013 case Maryland v. King,49 the 
United States Supreme Court decided that the extraction and 
analysis of DNA from an individual arrested on probable cause of a 
serious offense is a search that is part of the singular process of 
to be inadmissible. 
46. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. In noting the medical invasiveness of blood testing,
Skinner picked up where Schmerber had left off. Skinner begins an ongoing judicial 
discussion that separates the analysis of blood with its distinct privacy concerns (for 
instance, medical information being exposed) from the privacy concerns inherent 
in the blood draw (for instance, physical intrusion into the body). 
47. Id. at 634. Notably, Skinner was not a DUI case, so the Court’s conclusions
in Skinner may not have been as binding on DUI case law as Schmerber was. In Skinner, 
the government was testing urine samples of railway workers in order to make sure 
that no railway employees were intoxicated. Id. at 620–21. Therefore, although the 
Court in Skinner detoured briefly into a discussion of blood draw testing, the way in 
which the context of Skinner differs from the general context of DUI case law is one 
reason the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in a 1994 decision with facts nearly identical 
to the facts in State v. Fawcett, see infra Section III.A, decided that Skinner was not 
controlling. State v. Sanders, Nos. 93-2284-CR, 93-2286-CR, 1994 WL 481723, at *5 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (unpublished table decision). 
48. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616, 633–34; see also Natalie Logan, Questions of Time,
Place, and Mo(o)re: Personal Property Rights and Continued Seizure Under the DNA Act, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 733, 740 (2012) (“Once collected, the analysis of the sample constitutes 
a second, independent search of the seized sample.”). It has been argued that the 
Court’s use of the term “further invasion” in Skinner was not intended to make a 
clear distinction between the Fourth Amendment significance of a blood draw and 
a blood sample’s analysis since Skinner’s factual context did not involve blood draws 
and was based on the “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement instead 
of the “exigent circumstances” exception that is the basis of DUI blood draws and 
testing. Nedelcu, supra note 11, at 195. However, the fact that the Skinner Court 
intentionally detoured into a discussion of blood draws and relied on Hicks—a case 
that clearly exemplifies what a “further invasion” looks like in a non-biological 
sample case, see supra note 45—indicate that the Court’s use of the term “further 
invasion” was in fact intended to allow future courts to assign independent Fourth 
Amendment significance to blood sample analysis. 
49. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
13
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arrest.50 The testing of blood samples obtained through warrantless 
blood draws in suspected drunk driving cases is not considered 
“administrative” as the DNA sample in King was.51 However, King is 
still important to suspected drunk driving blood draw cases because 
the Supreme Court interpreted the search in King to include both 
the taking and the analyzing of a suspect’s biological information.52 
The decision in King that the drawing and the analysis of blood is a 
“search” differs from the many post-Snyder state cases. Since many 
post-Snyder state court cases held that testing of biological material is 
not a search and does not require analysis of whether the intrusion 
offended an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy,53 the 
Supreme Court’s holding in King clearly takes courts in a direction 
that favors individuals’ rights to the privacy of their own blood. 
In its 2016 case Birchfield v. North Dakota,54 the United States 
Supreme Court bolstered its King interpretation of what a search is. 
Reflecting on its King decision, the Court identified that the 
authorities’ possession of King’s DNA was a greater intrusion into 
the suspect’s expectation of privacy than the level of intrusion 
50. Id. at 1965 (“[T]he Court concludes that DNA identification of arrestees is
a reasonable search . . . .”); id. at 1980 (“When officers make an arrest supported by 
probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station 
to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA 
. . . is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis added)). 
51. Id. at 1970.
52. Id. at 1980 (“[O]nce respondent’s DNA was lawfully collected the STR
analysis of respondent’s DNA . . . did not amount to a significant invasion of privacy 
that would render the DNA identification impermissible under the Fourth 
Amendment.” (emphases added)). In its language, the Court differentiated 
between the DNA’s collection, which it deemed lawful, and the DNA’s analysis, 
which it reviewed in terms of whether the analysis was an “invasion of privacy.” 
Though the Court found the analysis was not a “significant invasion of privacy,” it 
nevertheless deemed it an “intrusion.” Id. Finally, the Court weighed the personal 
“intrusion” of the analysis against the state’s interest in using the results of the 
analysis. Id. at 1970. This identification of an “intrusion” that the state’s interest 
must overcome shows that the Court attributed some Fourth Amendment 
significance to the analysis of DNA. See id. at 1977. The Court did not go so far as to 
use Skinner as a conduit to classify analysis of a biological sample as a “further 
invasion” independent of the biological sample’s extraction. See id. at 1978. 
However, the Court still defended the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the analysis of his or her biological sample, even though such expectation was 
lumped together with the individual’s expectation of privacy regarding extraction 
of his or her biological sample. See id. at 1979–80. 
53. See supra note 29.
54. 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
14
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required to conduct a breath test.55 The Court found that analysis of 
the DNA sample in King was more intrusive than breath testing in 
general because authorities in the King case could have used the 
DNA sample to find a “wealth of . . . highly personal information.”56 
The Court in Birchfield reasoned that the potential for discovery of 
highly personal information in King was significant regardless of the 
fact that the law did not allow authorities to use DNA evidence to 
extract personal and medical information from King.57 
Therefore, from its 1989 Skinner decision to its 2016 Birchfield 
decision, the United States Supreme Court has continuously 
categorized the analysis of biological material obtained from a 
suspects’ blood draw as at least a search that is part of a Fourth 
Amendment event and at most a Fourth Amendment event in and 
of itself. 
B. Limitations on Search and Seizure Law 
1. Minnesota Requires Warrant Affidavits and Applications to Be
Particularized and Establish Probable Cause
The Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that an 
application for a search warrant, “interpreted in a common-sense 
and realistic manner, must be found to contain information which 
would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the 
articles sought are located at the place to be searched.”58 Further, a 
reviewing magistrate must determine in a “common-sense and 
practical manner” whether or not the submitted warrant application 
and affidavit give rise to the probable cause needed for the 
magistrate to issue the warrant.59 In reviewing the warrant 
application and affidavit, the issuing magistrate must evaluate the 
“totality of the circumstances” available to him or her through the 
affidavit, not the actual circumstances known to the officer 
requesting the warrant.60 
55. Id. at 2177.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. State v. Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 858 (Minn. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Rosillo v. State, 278 N.W.2d 747, 748–49 (Minn. 1979)). 
59. State v. Kahn, 555 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v.
Eggler, 372 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)). 
60. Id. at 18 (citing State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985)).
15
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The court recognizes that the magistrate’s decision to issue a 
warrant is tied to the level of detail provided to him or her in the 
affidavit, and the decision depends on whether these details 
adequately describe probable cause of a nexus between the 
contraband, the location of the contraband, and the individual.61 
Even if a magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant is challenged, the 
reviewing court is expected to “pay great deference to the 
magistrate’s determination.”62 The reviewing court “may not engage 
in a hypertechnical examination of the affidavit.”63 
2. Minnesota Courts Allow Flexibility in Achieving Warrant
Particularity
Minnesota has agreed with the United States Supreme Court 
that a search must be limited in scope to the circumstances that gave 
rise to the search.64 Further, the Particularity Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment limits warranted searches to the scope of the warrant.65 
A search has not gone beyond the scope of the warrant if the court 
considers the search’s relationship to the warrant to be 
“reasonable.”66 Minnesota courts grant a “degree of flexibility” in 
determining whether such a warranted search has violated the 
Particularity Clause.67 The Minnesota Supreme Court has specifically 
noted that “[a] warrant which describes things in broad and generic 
terms may be valid when the description is as specific as the 
61. Id. at 18–19. For example, in Kahn, the Minnesota Court of Appeals barred
evidence obtained from a search warrant that had been issued subsequent to an 
officer’s application and affidavit listing a loose association between the contraband, 
its location, and the individual. Id. at 18. The warrant application and affidavit 
described an amount of cocaine that had been seized from the respondent’s person, 
the address of where the respondent was known to have lived (at least seventy-five 
miles from the place the respondent was detained), and the officer’s assessment 
that such an amount of cocaine found on respondent usually means there is a larger 
selling operation in progress. Id. 
62. Id. (citing Eggler, 372 N.W.2d at 15).
63. Id.
64. State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 62 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). 
65. State v. Soua Thao Yang, 352 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). 
66. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)).
67. State v. Poole, 499 N.W.2d 31, 34 (Minn. 1993).
16
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circumstances and nature of the activity under investigation 
permit.”68 
3. In 2016, the United States Supreme Court Recognized a Warrant
Application’s Power to Inform the Warrant in Birchfield
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the United States Supreme Court 
evaluated three cases—two cases originating in North Dakota and 
one case originating in Minnesota.69 In the Minnesota case, the 
defendant refused to take a warrantless breath test after having been 
arrested and taken to the police station.70 The Court reasoned that 
in the Minnesota case (as well in as the two North Dakota cases), if 
the police had obtained a warrant prior to administering a breath 
test, “the scope of the warrant would [have simply been] a BAC test 
of the arrestee.”71 The Court concluded that a warrant requirement 
for all breath tests is unnecessary because the officers’ 
characterizations of facts are substantially similar across most drunk 
driving stops.72 The Court noted that if warrants were required for 
all breath tests, many warrants would be substantially similar to each 
other and would waste time recounting facts common to all DUI 
cases.73 Because such a scripted recitation of facts from the officer to 
the warrant-issuing judge would be a waste of time, police are not 
required to burden magistrates by obtaining warrants before 
performing breath tests on suspected drunk drivers.74 
68. Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Hannuksela,
452 N.W.2d 668, 674 (Minn. 1990)). For example, a warrant allowing the seizure 
and search of the complete patient profiles of all women treated for family practice 
services by a doctor who was suspected of criminal sexual activity was deemed to 
have not been overbroad, because the extent of the doctor’s suspected criminal 
sexual activity was unknown. Id. 
69. 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2162–63 (2016).
70. Id. at 2163.
71. Id. at 2181.
72. Id. (“In order to persuade a magistrate that there is probable cause for a
search warrant, the officer would typically recite the same facts that led the officer 
to find that there was probable cause for arrest.”). The Court describes how police 
observations of DUI suspects often rely on common themes, such as “a strong odor 
of alcohol, that the motorist wobbled when attempting to stand, that the motorist 
paused when reciting the alphabet or counting backwards, and so on.” Id. Despite 
this seeming monotony in warrant applications and affidavits, the Court points out, 
regarding the power of the warrant-applying officer, “A magistrate would be in a 
poor position to challenge such characterizations.” Id. 
73. Id. at 2181–82.
74. Id. at 2181–82, 2184.
17
Porter: Blood on Their Hands: What Minnesota Authorities Can Do with Broa
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
84 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW SUA SPONTE [Vol. 43:6 
The Court’s reasoning and conclusion in Birchfield regarding 
breath tests identify great power in Minnesota warrant applications 
and affidavits. By asserting that facts are substantially similar in most 
drunk driving stops and by asserting that the scope of the warrant in 
the Minnesota case would have been tied to the facts given by the 
detaining officer had the warrant been issued, the Court implies that 
a Minnesota warrant derives its authority largely from the facts of the 
incident as communicated by the detaining officer rather than from 
the judge who issues the warrant based on these facts. Thus, 
according to the Supreme Court, a warrant is unnecessary to verify 
the facts leading up to most blood draws. The warrant is only 
important in assessing the constitutionality of intrusions into 
suspects’ expectations of privacy regarding blood draws and blood 
analyses.75 
III. STATE V. FAWCETT CASE DESCRIPTION
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
On May 24, 2014, at an intersection in Blaine, Minnesota, Debra 
Fawcett drove through a red light and crashed into another vehicle.76 
The collision left the driver of the other vehicle bleeding and with 
either a broken leg or ankle.77 Fawcett also sustained minor 
injuries.78 As Fawcett talked with an officer who arrived at the scene 
of the crash, the officer perceived alcohol on Fawcett’s breath.79 
“Fawcett admitted [to the officer] she had consumed ‘two to three 
beers’ earlier.”80 Medical personnel arrived after this conversation 
and took Fawcett to Mercy Hospital.81 
As Fawcett was being taken to Mercy Hospital, a police detective 
submitted an application for a search warrant82 requesting 
75. This reasoning explains why the Birchfield Court required warrants for
blood tests but not for breath tests. Id. at 2187. 






82. Although pre-Birchfield Minnesota law in 2014, like the law of other states
at that time, allowed police to force drivers to submit to warrantless blood draws in 
certain circumstances under the doctrine of “implied consent,” police chose to 
obtain a warrant anyway in Fawcett’s case. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2162–63. This 
18
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permission to secure “a blood sample of [Fawcett] as evidence of the 
crime of criminal vehicular operation/homicide.”83 Portions of the 
warrant application and supporting affidavit especially descriptive of 
Fawcett’s perceived condition of impairment were as follows: 
• “Fawcett admitted to the officers that she was driving and
had been drinking prior to the crash.”84
• “From their investigation, officers formed the belief that at
the time of the collision . . . Fawcett was the driver and was
under the influence of alcohol.”85
• “Fawcett admitted to responding officers that she had two
or three drinks just prior to the crash, she smelled of an
alcoholic beverage and it was apparent to officers on-scene
that she had been drinking.”86
The warrant application and supporting affidavit made no mention 
of any suspicion of the presence of drugs in Fawcett’s system. 
The judge to whom the warrant application and affidavit were 
submitted issued a warrant allowing the police to direct a draw of 
Fawcett’s blood at Mercy Hospital and to send the blood to an 
approved lab for testing.87 The judge reasoned that the blood 
“constitutes evidence which tends to show a crime has been 
committed, or tends to show that a particular person has committed 
a crime.” Regarding the timeliness of the warrant’s issuance, the 
judge noted that “[d]ue to the dissipation of alcohol/drugs in the 
human body this warrant may be served at anytime during the day 
or night.”88 
precaution may indicate Minnesota police suspected that a Birchfield-like decision 
was imminent, and they may have wanted to justify their actions against foreseeable 
legal challenges. 
83. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 382. Note that although the police suspected Fawcett
had committed the crime of “criminal vehicular operation/homicide,” this does not 
imply that Fawcett committed criminal vehicular homicide. “Criminal vehicular 
operation/homicide” was simply the then-current statutory language of a crime that 
could be committed either by criminal vehicular operation that resulted in bodily 
harm or by criminal vehicular operation that resulted in a death. See MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.21 (2007) (renumbered MINN. STAT. §§ 609.2111–.2114 on Aug. 1, 2014).
There are now separate offenses for criminal vehicular homicide, MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.2112 (2016), and criminal vehicular operation with bodily harm, § 609.2113
(2016). 
84. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 383–84.
85. Id.




Porter: Blood on Their Hands: What Minnesota Authorities Can Do with Broa
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
86 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW SUA SPONTE [Vol. 43:6 
The police went to Mercy Hospital and presented the signed 
warrant.89 Fawcett completed a preliminary breath test (PBT), and a 
medical professional drew a sample of her blood.90 The PBT read 
.000.91 Fawcett told the police that “she was depressed and was 
currently taking Lorazepam and Wellbutrin.”92 Police submitted 
Fawcett’s blood sample to the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension 
(“BCA”) to be analyzed.93 
On June 24, 2014, the BCA reported that it had not found any 
ethyl alcohol in Fawcett’s blood sample.94 Nevertheless, the report 
maintained that “additional toxicology report(s) [would] follow.”95 
On September 9, 2014, the BCA reported that Fawcett’s blood 
“contained a metabolite of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and 
Alprazolam at the time of the accident.”96 
On October 16, 2014, the State filed a complaint charging 
Fawcett with criminal vehicular operation under Minnesota Statutes 
section 609.21, subdivision 1(2)(ii).97 The statute reads, “A person is 
guilty of criminal vehicular homicide or operation . . . if the person 
causes injury to or the death of another as a result of operating a 
motor vehicle . . . in a negligent manner while under the influence 
of . . . a controlled substance.”98 
Fawcett motioned to suppress “all evidence of the presence of 
drugs.”99 She argued that the warrant did not give the police the 
authority to test her blood for the presence of controlled 
substances.100 The trial court granted Fawcett’s motion to suppress 
evidence of the presence of drugs in her blood.101 The trial court 










98. MINN. STAT. § 609.21, subdiv. 1(2)(ii) (2012). Since the State did not
charge Fawcett with criminal vehicular homicide or operation involving a 
combination of one or more controlled substances and alcohol according to MINN. 
STAT. § 609.21, subdiv. 1(2)(iii), it follows that at some point, the State realized its 
mistaken reliance on the idea that Fawcett was under the influence of alcohol. 




Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 6 [2017], Art. 4
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss6/4
2017] STATE V. FAWCETT 87 
and analyze it for the presence of alcohol but, after initial testing 
results indicated there was no alcohol in Fawcett’s blood, not for the 
presence of drugs.102 The trial court reasoned that the testing of 
Fawcett’s blood should have been “limited in scope to the probable 
cause presented in the application and affidavit, namely, a search of 
[Fawcett’s] blood to obtain evidence of alcohol use.”103 
The State appealed the trial court’s suppression of the 
secondary testing of Fawcett’s blood for drugs, arguing that the 
results of that test provided its sole proof that Fawcett was under the 
influence of a controlled substance during the crash.104 The issue of 
whether the testing of a blood draw was an independent Fourth 
Amendment event was a matter of first impression for the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals.105 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the 
suppression order,106 reasoning that no one has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a blood sample that has been lawfully 
taken.107 The court held that because Fawcett did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in her blood, the testing of her 
blood was “not a distinct Fourth Amendment event.”108 Fawcett 
subsequently petitioned to the Minnesota Supreme Court,109 and the 
court granted review.110 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Ruling 
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals to reverse the suppression of the drug 
testing of Fawcett’s blood sample.111 Substantively, the Minnesota 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 383–84. 
105. State v. Fawcett, 877 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (“[T]here is 
no binding authority of which we are aware considering whether the chemical 
analysis of blood is a Fourth Amendment event distinct from the blood draw itself.”), 
aff’d, 884 N.W.2d 380. 
106. Id. at 556. 
107. Id. at 561. 
108. Id. 
109. Petition for Further Review and Addendum, Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380 (No. 
A15-0938),http://macsnc.courts.state.mn.us/ctrack/view/publicCaseMaintenance 
.do?csNameID=80658&csInstanceID=92541#. 
110. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384. 
111. Id. at 388. 
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Supreme Court allowed evidence of Fawcett’s drug use to be 
presented at Fawcett’s criminal trial.112 
The reasoning the Minnesota Supreme Court gave for vacating 
the trial court’s suppression order differs dramatically from the 
reasoning given by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The supreme 
court acknowledged that Fawcett had some expectation of privacy in 
her blood sample even after the blood sample was drawn.113 The 
supreme court dodged the issue of whether Fawcett’s expectation of 
privacy was “reasonable” by concluding that at any rate, the warrant 
was valid and was sufficient to overcome any expectation of privacy, 
reasonable or unreasonable, that Fawcett had about her blood.114 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals did not need to grapple with the 
issue of reasonableness due to its denial of the existence of any 
expectation of privacy Fawcett might have had in her blood.115 
In her brief to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Fawcett argued 
that since the warrant application and affidavit only gave evidence of 
her alcohol use and did not present any evidence of the use of 
controlled substances, the corresponding warrant failed in two ways: 
the warrant did not give the police probable cause to re-search the 
blood for the presence of controlled substances,116 and it was 
overbroad in indiscriminately allowing all types of testing to be 
conducted on her blood, therefore violating the Particularity Clause 
of the Fourth Amendment.117 To bolster her argument of the 
warrant’s overbreadth, Fawcett submitted a letter of supplemental 
authority to the Minnesota Supreme Court on June 27, 2016, 
explaining that the United States Supreme Court’s June 23, 2016, 
decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota clarified that when seized 
through the use of a warrant, a blood sample can only be tested to 
the extent allowable under that warrant.118 
112. Id. at 382, 388. 
113. Id. at 384 n.3. 
114. Id. (noting that since the warrant was found to be a valid basis for the 
testing, the court did not need to resolve the exact extent of the expectation of 
privacy Fawcett retained in her blood). 
 115. See generally State v. Fawcett, 877 N.W.2d 555 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, 
884 N.W.2d 380. 
 116. Appellant’s Brief and Addendum at 13–33, Fawcett, 877 N.W.2d 555 (No. 
A15-0938). 
117. See id. at 33–45. 
 118. Appellant’s Letter of Citation of Supplemental Authority at 1, Fawcett, 877 
N.W.2d 555 (No. A15-0938) (citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 
(2016)). 
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The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged the significance 
of Birchfield in establishing an expectation of privacy in one’s blood 
sample, which a warrant must overcome.119 However, the court 
rejected both of appellant Fawcett’s arguments regarding the 
insufficiency of the warrant.120 In rejecting Fawcett’s argument about 
the lack of probable cause, the court explained that it was upholding 
the probable cause standard by requiring warrant-issuing judges to 
have theoretically reasoned that the facts in the warrant application 
and affidavit provide a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of 
a crime will be found in a particular place.”121 
The Minnesota Supreme Court explained that when there is 
dispute as to whether there is enough probable cause to justify a 
search warrant, deference is given to a warrant-issuing magistrate’s 
inferences.122 This deference does not extend to the applicant’s 
interpretation of the information that he or she provided the 
magistrate.123 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that based on the 
totality of the facts presented in the warrant application and the 
affidavit, including facts describing Fawcett’s crash and the police’s 
perception of Fawcett’s condition, “the issuing judge [had] a 
substantial basis to conclude there was a fair probability that 
evidence of criminal vehicular operation would be found in 
Fawcett’s blood.”124 Specifically, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
concluded that the warrant-issuing judge in Fawcett had a substantial 
basis to infer that there may have been more intoxicants in Fawcett’s 
blood than just alcohol.125 Accordingly, the belief that the blood 
119. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384 n.3. 
120. Id. at 384–88. 
121. Id. at 385 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 223 
(Minn. 2010)). 
122. Id. 
 123. Id.; see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948)) (“The requirement that a 
warrant be obtained is a requirement that inferences to support the search ‘be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”). 
124. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 385. 
125. The Minnesota Supreme Court did acknowledge that the warrant and 
supporting affidavit stated that “Fawcett was the driver and was under the influence 
of alcohol.” Id. However, it seems the court wanted to downplay the affiant’s strong 
assertion of Fawcett’s impairment by alcohol by avoiding use of the word “alcohol.” 
The court used the phrases “under the influence” and “impaired” in describing how 
the warrant-issuing magistrate may have interpreted the warrant application and 
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would contain “evidence of criminal vehicular operation” was 
sufficiently particular as tested from the standpoint of the warrant-
issuing judge, and the judge’s decision to issue the warrant was not 
so unreasonable that the Minnesota Supreme Court would overturn 
it.126 
The Minnesota Supreme Court also rejected Fawcett’s 
argument that the warrant violated the Particularity Clause and was 
overbroad in its direction to send “Fawcett’s blood sample ‘to an 
approved lab for testing.’”127 In rejecting this argument, the court 
reasoned that the warrant-issuing judge had properly weighed “the 
circumstances of the case . . . , as well as the nature of the crime 
under investigation and whether a more precise description [was] 
possible under the circumstances.”128 The court held that the 
warrant was not overbroad in the particular circumstances at hand 
because it authorized the search of Fawcett’s blood for “evidence of 
the crime of criminal vehicular operation/homicide.”129 This 
categorization is broader than a hypothetically similar order limiting 
the search of Fawcett’s blood to only signs of alcohol use. However, 
the court reasoned that such broadening was lawful because 
Minnesota law limited the search to discovery of the presence of 
“alcohol and/or controlled substances.”130 Further, the court 
reasoned that the search was limited in that it did not authorize the 
testing of Fawcett’s blood for health or DNA information.131 
C. The Dissents 
Justices Stras, Lillehaug, and Hudson dissented.132 None of 
these three dissenting justices found the majority’s requirement that 
the warrant have probable cause and particularity for both the blood 
draw and the blood analysis133 to be objectionable.134 In fact, they 
affidavit instead of “under the influence of alcohol” or “impaired by alcohol.” See id. at 
386 (describing Fawcett as “under the influence” or “impaired”). 
126. Id. at 385. 
127. Id. at 387. 
128. Id. (quoting State v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703, 713 (Minn. 2003)). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.21, subdiv. 1(2) (2007)). 
131. Id. at 387–88. 
132. Id. at 388–91. 
133. See id. at 384–87. 
134. See id. at 388–91. 
24
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 6 [2017], Art. 4
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss6/4
2017] STATE V. FAWCETT 91 
complimented the majority’s reasoning by further explaining the 
need for the testing of the blood sample to be tied to the warrant.135 
The dissents simply found that the majority’s conclusion, that 
the warrant and the application documents the warrant relied upon 
had facts sufficient to establish probable cause,136 was made without 
proper consideration of the warrant applicant’s affidavit.137 The 
dissents were largely in agreement on where the majority erred.138 
Justice Stras’s dissent, joined by Justices Lillehaug and Hudson as to 
the first two parts, contended that the warrant application only 
established probable cause for the presence of alcohol in Fawcett’s 
blood, not the presence of controlled substances.139 Justice Stras 
further contended, in a similar vein, that there were no direct facts 
to support a warrant-issuing judge’s possible inference that Fawcett 
was intoxicated by anything other than alcohol.140 Finally, Justice 
Stras pointed out that the affidavit’s statement that police “sought 
evidence of the crime of criminal vehicular operation/homicide” 
 135. All the dissenting justices agreed with the majority’s first point—that blood 
draws require warrants with sufficient particularity. Id. at 389 (Stras, J., dissenting) 
(citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990)) (“The permissible extent of 
the invasion is tied to the scope of the warrant.”); id. at 391 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting) 
(joining the dissent of Justice Stras in parts I and II); id. (Hudson, J., dissenting) 
(joining the dissent of Justice Lillehaug). 
 136. Id. at 385 (majority opinion) (“[T]he issuing judge had a substantial basis 
to conclude there was a fair probability that evidence of intoxicants, whether 
alcohol, controlled substances, or a combination of alcohol and controlled 
substances would be found in Fawcett’s blood.”). 
 137. Id. at 390 (Stras, J., dissenting) (“The fact that the affidavit generally 
references the suspected crime [of criminal vehicular homicide or operation] is of 
little assistance.”); id. at 391 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Stras and 
reiterating that “[t]he search-warrant application and affidavit, on their face, failed 
to establish probable cause for the search of appellant’s blood for controlled 
substances”); id. (Hudson, J., dissenting) (joining the dissent of Justice Lillehaug). 
 138. Id. at 388–91 (Stras, J., dissenting) (organizing the dissent into three parts: 
(I) recollection of facts, (II) critique of unlikely inferences the majority awards the 
issuing judge and critique of undue expansion of probable cause, and (III) 
discussion of adopting the good faith exception in Minnesota); id. at 391 (Lillehaug, 
J., dissenting) (joining the dissent of Justice Stras in parts I and II but not in part 
III); id. (Hudson, J., dissenting) (joining the dissent of Justice Lillehaug). Justices 
Lillehaug and Hudson did not join Justice Stras in his discussion of the good faith 
exception to the warrant requirement because they felt that since the parties did 
not mention the good faith exception, the court should not address the issue. Id. at 
391 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). 
139. Id. at 388 (Stras, J., dissenting). 
140. Id. at 389–90. 
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was “vague and conclusory” and that such language should have 
been insufficient to establish a basis to issue a warrant.141 
Justice Stras detoured into a brief discussion of the good faith 
exception. He explained that the Supreme Court has permitted 
states to accept evidence police obtained with a faulty warrant when 
the police believed in good faith that the warrant was valid.142 Justice 
Stras further explained that Minnesota has elected to apply the 
“good faith” exception “only when officers act pursuant to binding 
appellate precedent.”143 He concluded that he would have been 
willing to consider adopting the good faith exception in full had the 
parties made arguments on this point.144 
IV. ANALYSIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fawcett decision was subject to 
pressure from two competing policy ideals: state concerns of 
enforcing justice and individuals’ privacy concerns. On the one 
hand, testing of blood samples is helpful to state concerns of 
identifying suspects pursuant to pre-trial holding and other 
administrative needs145 and determining whether a suspected 
criminal was under an illegal level of substance influence at the time 
of the crime.146 On the other hand, testing blood samples may 
141. Id. at 390 (quoting State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Minn. 1998)). 
142. Id. at 390–91. 
143. Id. at 391 (quoting State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 876 (Minn. 2015)). 
Minnesota’s partial adoption of the “good faith” warrant exception is less expansive 
than the Supreme Court’s adoption of the same exception. Id. at 391 (Lillehaug, J., 
dissenting). Justice Stras believes the Fawcett case is “so similar to Leon, the seminal 
good-faith exception case, that there is little to distinguish them.” Id. (Stras, J., 
dissenting) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). Yet, because the 
Minnesota Supreme Court did not apply the good faith exception in Fawcett, it had 
to rely on what Justice Stras considered an “unnatural stretching” of probable cause 
to include probable cause of drug use. Id. 
 144. Id. It is unclear whether Justice Stras is alone in his willingness to consider 
Minnesota’s full adoption of the “good faith” exception to the warrant requirement, 
but the rest of the justices’ responses indicate that they are unwilling to proactively 
rule on the “good faith” exception until the issue is raised by parties before the 
court. See id. (Lillehaug, J., dissenting); id. (Hudson, J., dissenting). Justice Lillehaug 
expressly declined to engage with Justice Stras’s exploration into the “good faith” 
exception for just this reason. Id. (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). A similar disposition of 
the majority justices might be inferred by the fact that they ignored the good faith 
exception in their opinion. 
145. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
146. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–72 (1966) (deeming a 
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compromise individuals’ privacy concerns because a person’s blood 
contains a “host of private medical facts”147 and a “wealth of 
additional, highly personal information.”148 The existence of a 
person’s medical facts and personal information in his or her blood 
has given courts pause and reason to consider whether or not an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her blood 
that must be overcome by the government’s interest in the search.149 
In resolving the competing policy considerations of state 
concerns and individuals’ privacy concerns, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in Fawcett makes two major assertions: 
(1) The testing of a blood draw is a search.150 
(2) A warrant for a blood draw must particularly describe how 
the blood will be tested.151 
Regarding the first assertion, the court’s rule that blood testing 
is a search raises a number of questions about the standards 
governing the state’s intrusion into an individual’s expectation of 
privacy.152 Chief among these questions are the following: 
(1) Is categorizing testing of a blood sample as a search in line 
with precedential authority? 
(2) Did the court properly identify the level of privacy 
expectation Fawcett had in her blood? 
(3) Did the court err by not characterizing Fawcett’s seizure and 
subsequent blood draw and analysis as one Fourth 
Amendment event, as other states have classified the process 
of a blood draw and testing? 
The following analysis shows that (1) the classification of the 
testing of Fawcett’s blood sample as a search was proper because this 
framework is in line with United States Supreme Court precedent, 
warrantless blood draw sufficient to convict the petitioner of drunk driving due to 
exigent circumstances). 
147. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989). 
148. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2177 (2016). 
149. The government’s interest in conducting a search does not automatically 
trump any individual expectation of privacy because such an expectation of privacy 
is a basic right protected by the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (“The 
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and 
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”). 
150. See infra Section IV.A. 
151. See infra Section IV.B. 
152. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618–19 (1989) (“To hold that the Fourth 
Amendment is applicable to the drug and alcohol testing . . . is only to begin the 
inquiry into the standards governing such intrusions.”). 
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though it departs from existing Minnesota case law and the case law 
of other states;153 (2) the level of Fawcett’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy in her blood was properly identified;154 and (3) the court 
properly avoided categorizing the seizure and search of Fawcett’s 
blood as one Fourth Amendment event. 155 
Regarding the second assertion made in Fawcett, the court’s rule 
that a warrant for a blood draw must particularly describe how the 
blood will be tested is proper in light of controlling precedent. 
However, the assertion invites a number of questions necessary in 
evaluating whether such particularity was met in Fawcett’s situation. 
Chief among these questions are the following: 
(1) Since the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ Fawcett decision did 
not address whether the items to be found in a blood draw 
need to be identified by a particularized warrant, was the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s application of the particularity 
requirement to the warrant for blood draw and testing 
proper? 
(2) From whose perspective should the content of the warrant 
application be interpreted? 
(3) Was the holding that the warrant was particular enough to 
authorize the testing of Fawcett’s blood for drugs proper? 
The following discussion shows that (1) application of the 
warrant’s particularity to the blood draw and testing was proper and 
will likely be longstanding;156 (2) the warrant’s particularity should 
have been interpreted as from the eyes of the officer submitting the 
affidavit, who did not particularly describe the presence of drugs;157 
and (3) the ruling that the warrant was particular enough to justify 
the search of Fawcett’s blood for the presence of drugs was improper 
and sets a harmful precedent.158 Since the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s answers to (2) and (3) did not match its correct assertion in 
(1) that a warrant for a blood draw must particularly describe how 
the blood is to be tested, the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in the 
application of its principle. 
153. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
154. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
155. See infra Section IV.A.3. 
156. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
157. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
158. See infra Section IV.B.3. 
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A. The Testing of a Blood Draw Is a Search 
1. Classification of the Testing of Fawcett’s Blood Sample as a Search
Was Proper
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s conclusion that Fawcett’s 
blood draw and testing was a search159 is well supported by recent 
United States Supreme Court precedent. This Supreme Court 
precedent identifies two distinct ways in which a blood draw and 
testing intrude upon expectations of privacy, thus constituting a 
search. 
First, a blood draw and testing intrude upon an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of physical privacy by entering a person’s 
body in a somewhat violent manner.160 Fawcett’s skin was pierced by 
a needle which subsequently entered her body and drew blood from 
her body. Through this process, Fawcett’s reasonable expectation of 
physical privacy was intruded upon. 
In 2013, the United States Supreme Court held in Maryland v. 
King that even such an unobtrusive intrusion as a buccal swab, a 
piece of cotton rubbed on the inside of a suspect’s cheek, and the 
buccal swab’s subsequent testing is still a search.161 The King holding 
is applicable to all techniques used to take biological samples that 
the Supreme Court has ruled on because of all such techniques, a 
buccal swab is arguably the least physically intrusive.162 It follows that 
more physically intrusive techniques, like the blood draw Fawcett was 
subject to, are also searches.163 
Second, in addition to a blood draw’s intrusion into a person’s 
expectation of physical privacy, the testing of the drawn blood 
intrudes upon an individual’s expectation of medical and personal 
privacy. Having already established in Skinner v. Railway Labor 
 159. See State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Minn. 2016) (“[T]he issuing 
judge limited the search of Fawcett’s blood.”). 
 160. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2163 (2016) (citing 
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013)) (“Our cases establish that the taking of a 
blood sample . . . is a search.”). 
 161. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968–69 (“It can be agreed that using a buccal swab on 
the inner tissues of a person’s cheek in order to obtain DNA samples is a search.”). 
 162. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.6(a) (5th ed. 2016) (pointing out 
that “any lingering doubts” as to whether techniques less intrusive than blood draws 
and testing still amounted to searches “were swept away by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Maryland v. King”). 
163. See id. 
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Executives’ Ass’n that an individual’s blood contains a “host of private 
medical facts,”164 the Court in Birchfield v. North Dakota added that 
that blood contains a “wealth of additional, highly personal 
information.”165 The fact that Fawcett was a reasonable individual 
who knew her blood contained personal and medical information is 
exemplified by Fawcett’s declaration to police that “she was 
depressed and was currently taking Lorazepam and Wellbutrin.”166 
Fawcett may not have revealed that she suffered from such a 
stigmatized illness as depression had it not been for the fact that she 
was or was about to be subjected to testing she thought would reveal 
such information anyway. United States Supreme Court precedent 
in Skinner and Birchfield has validated that such a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is intruded upon when blood is tested. 
The conclusion that the testing of a blood draw is a search is 
new precedent for the state of Minnesota.167 Although the Minnesota 
Supreme Court did not overrule Harrison v. Commissioner of Public 
Safety,168 its conclusion that testing a blood draw constitutes a search 
164. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989). 
165. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177. 
166. State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Minn. 2016). 
167. Prior to Fawcett, the authoritative interpretation of whether the testing of a 
blood sample was a search was the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ 2010 Harrison 
decision, which found that such testing did not constitute a search. See Harrison v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); supra note 41. 
Following Harrison, even after the United States Supreme Court released its 
Maryland v. King decision, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held in Fawcett that “[i]f 
the state lawfully obtains a blood sample for the purpose of chemical analysis, then 
a chemical analysis of the sample that does not offend standards of reasonableness 
is not a separate search requiring a warrant.” State v. Fawcett, 877 N.W.2d 555, 561 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, 884 N.W.2d 380. Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s decision of Fawcett was the first time the court addressed the issue of whether 
a blood sample’s testing was a search. Contrary to the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ 
Harrison and Fawcett decisions, the Minnesota Supreme Court viewed the testing of 
the blood draw as indeed a search. See Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 387 (“[T]he issuing 
judge limited the search of Fawcett’s blood.”). 
 168. Perhaps the Minnesota Supreme Court did not overturn Harrison because 
Harrison relied on a blood draw that was taken with probable cause and under the 
exigency exception to the warrant requirement. Harrison, 781 N.W.2d at 920–21. 
Since the United States Supreme Court issued its 2016 Birchfield decision, reliance 
on the exigency exception for blood draws in DUI cases is no longer available 
because blood draws and testing now require warrants. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184–
85. Because a warrant is now required in all cases, there is less policy pressure to
categorize blood testing as a non-search. Since a warrant is required for blood draws 
and testing anyway, courts might as well concede that such blood draws and tests 
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is the first time since Birchfield that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
has dealt with this issue. Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s reliance in Fawcett on relevant and very recent United States 
Supreme Court precedent is proper. 
2. The Level of Fawcett’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Her
Blood Was Properly Identified
The Minnesota Supreme Court decided that Fawcett did not 
lose all expectation of privacy in her blood sample after her blood 
was drawn.169 The court has left open for later ruling the question of 
exactly how much expectation of privacy an individual has in his or 
her blood sample once it is taken from the body.170 However, since 
the testing of Fawcett’s blood has been characterized as a search,171 
it can be inferred by the definition of a “search”172 that Fawcett’s 
expectation of privacy in her blood is at least reasonable. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court denied the reasonableness of 
Fawcett’s expectation of privacy in medical information that could 
be found in her blood because the warrant precluded using her 
are searches. Denial of the fact that blood testing is a search, or at least part of a 
search, no longer has the policy benefit of easing law enforcement’s ability to seize 
a suspect’s blood. Thus, the habit of many states to categorize blood testing as a non-
search might cease altogether. Another reason the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
Fawcett may have chosen not to overturn Harrison is that the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals said in Harrison that the defendant did not have a “legitimate expectation 
of privacy,” Harrison, 781 N.W.2d at 921, which the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
equated with being a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. (“[A] legitimate 
expectation of privacy [is] defined as ‘those expectations of privacy that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”). Therefore, although the court in Harrison 
concluded that the defendant was not searched, this is due to the fact that the 
defendant’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable, not that the defendant had 
no expectation of privacy whatsoever. This is a much less drastic or obviously errant 
position than saying that the defendant was not searched at all. Accordingly, 
perhaps the Minnesota Supreme Court in Fawcett did not overturn Harrison because 
Harrison was not an obvious candidate for reversal. 
169. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384 n.3. 
 170. Id. (“We need not resolve in this case the exact extent of the expectation 
of privacy Fawcett retained in her blood because, as explained below, we conclude 
that the warrant provided a valid basis for the controlled substance testing.”). 
171. Id. at 387 (“[T]he issuing judge limited the search of Fawcett’s blood.”). 
172. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“A ‘search’ occurs 
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is 
infringed.”). 
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blood sample for this purpose.173 However, the United States 
Supreme Court noted in Birchfield, commenting on its King decision, 
that although the authorities in King were legally allowed to use the 
defendant’s DNA only for identification purposes, the authorities 
could have obtained the defendant’s personal information from the 
sample, albeit illegally, if they had chosen to do so.174 Therefore, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s denial of Fawcett’s expectation of 
privacy in medical information that could be found in her blood 
does not account for the real possibility of illegal government 
intrusion that the United States Supreme Court is wary of. 
Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s acknowledgement in 
Fawcett of general, unspecified expectations of privacy is a proper 
concession that the court rightfully acknowledges to have been set 
in motion by United States Supreme Court precedent in Skinner and 
recently in Birchfield.175 
3. The Court Properly Avoided Categorizing Fawcett’s Blood Draw
and Subsequent Analysis as One Fourth Amendment Event
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fawcett decision properly 
changed the trajectory of blood draw testing case law by not 
categorizing Fawcett’s blood draw and the subsequent analysis of 
that blood as one Fourth Amendment event. It departed from the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ 2010 decision in Harrison, which 
assigned individuals no expectation of privacy in their blood samples 
once the blood was drawn and held that testing such samples was not 
 173. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 378–88 (“Contrary to Fawcett’s assertion, the search 
warrant in this case did not authorize general testing of Fawcett’s blood to 
determine her DNA, genome, or indicators of diseases because such testing would 
not have revealed any evidence of criminal vehicular operation/homicide.”). 
 174. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2177 (“Although the DNA 
obtained under the law at issue in that case could lawfully be used only for 
identification purposes, the process put into the possession of law enforcement 
authorities a sample from which a wealth of additional, highly personal information 
could potentially be obtained.”). Regarding the effect that this potential abuse of 
power has on the individual whose blood has been seized, the Court wrote, “Even if 
the law enforcement agency is precluded from testing the blood for any purpose 
other than to measure BAC, the potential remains and may result in anxiety for the 
person tested.” Id. at 2178. 
 175. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384 n.3 (citing Skinner for the proposition that an 
individual has an expectation of privacy in the medical facts a blood test reveals, and 
citing Birchfield for the proposition that an individual has an expectation of privacy 
in the personal information a blood test reveals). 
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a search.176 In its departure from Harrison, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in Fawcett established that there was both a seizure and a 
search in the process of Fawcett’s blood draw and the subsequent 
testing.177 This acknowledgement that the process of a DUI blood 
draw and analysis consists of a seizure and a separate search is similar 
to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Schmerber.178 
Although Fawcett’s characterization of the process of a blood 
draw and subsequent analysis as a seizure and a search is similar to 
such characterization in Schmerber, it differs from the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Schmerber in Snyder. In Snyder, the Ninth Circuit 
unceremoniously lumped together the seizure of a blood draw and 
the blood’s search, labeling these as one Fourth Amendment 
event.179 However, even though several state courts have followed 
Snyder’s interpretation of Schmerber,180 including the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals in its decision of Fawcett,181 the policy reason for 
connecting seizure of a blood draw with its subsequent search—
making it easier to seize blood with substances in it before these 
substances dissipate—no longer exists. After the United States 
176. Harrison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 177. See Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384 (“The warrant authorized the police to seize 
Fawcett’s blood . . . .”); id. at 387 (“[T]he issuing judge limited the search of 
Fawcett’s blood.”). 
 178. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“Such testing 
procedures plainly constitute searches of ‘persons,’ and depend antecedently upon 
seizures of ‘persons,’ within the meaning of that Amendment.”). 
 179. United States v. Snyder, 852 F.2d 471, 473–74 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It seems 
clear, however, that Schmerber viewed the seizure and separate search of the blood as 
a single event for fourth amendment purposes.”). 
180. See supra note 29. 
 181. State v. Fawcett, 877 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, 884 
N.W.2d 380 (“Once a blood sample has been lawfully removed from a person’s 
body, a person loses an expectation of privacy in the blood sample, and a subsequent 
chemical analysis of the blood sample is, therefore, not a distinct Fourth 
Amendment event.”). Notice here the evolution of the standard from Schmerber to 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ Fawcett decision: Schmerber said there is a seizure 
and a search in the process of a blood draw. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. Snyder said 
the seizure and search are both part of one Fourth Amendment event. Snyder, 852 
F.2d at 473–74. At that point, it was much easier for the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
to say in Fawcett that when blood is removed from a person’s body, that person no 
longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her blood and therefore 
there was no “distinct Fourth Amendment event” in analyzing the blood because 
Snyder had already negated the distinctiveness of the blood’s analysis (the search) 
by lumping it together with the blood’s seizure. 
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Supreme Court’s 2016 Birchfield decision, virtually all blood draws 
now need to be justified with time-consuming warrants anyway, and 
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is 
no longer applicable to all DUI blood draw cases.182 Thus, in light of 
this new warrant requirement for virtually all DUI blood draw cases, 
states like Minnesota might as well acknowledge that blood draws 
and blood testing are separate Fourth Amendment events; they no 
longer need to worry that such a concession will increase their 
workload. 
B. A Warrant for a Blood Draw Must Particularly Describe How the 
Blood Will Be Tested 
1. Application of the Warrant’s Particularity to the Blood Draw and
Testing Was Proper and Will Likely Be Longstanding
The main reason the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fawcett 
opinion is written so differently than the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals’ Fawcett opinion is that the opinions focused on different 
issues altogether. In the Minnesota Court of Appeals opinion, the 
issue of blood draws and the Particularity Clause regarding blood 
draws was a matter of first impression.183 In holding that an 
individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
or her blood sample once Minnesota authorities have legally drawn 
the sample, and in holding that the subsequent testing of said sample 
is not a distinct Fourth Amendment event,184 the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals shut the door on the question of particularity altogether. 
If there is no expectation of privacy, then there is no search. If there 
is no search, then there is no intrusion. If there is no intrusion, then 
there is no need for a warrant that would particularly describe items 
to be searched. The Minnesota Supreme Court re-opened this issue 
by acknowledging that Fawcett had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in her blood sample.185 
Unlike the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to engage with the question of 
 182. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016) (“[The states] have 
offered no satisfactory justification for demanding [blood draws] without a 
warrant.”). 
183. Fawcett, 877 N.W.2d at 559. 
184. See id. at 561. 
185. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384 n.3 (“We agree with Fawcett that she did not lose 
all expectation of privacy in her blood that was seized pursuant to a warrant.”). 
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sufficient particularity in its Fawcett decision because it 
acknowledged that the testing of a blood draw is a search that 
requires a warrant.186 After engaging with the question of sufficient 
particularity in Fawcett’s case, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
ultimately rejected Fawcett’s argument that the warrant was not 
sufficiently particular.187 It concluded that “the authorization to 
submit Fawcett’s blood sample ‘to an approved lab for testing’ meets 
minimal constitutional standards for particularity.”188 Nevertheless, 
the court’s particularity analysis regarding DUI blood draws and the 
court’s implicit recognition of the need for sufficient particularity 
has tremendous implications for how Minnesota DUI cases will be 
decided in the future. The Minnesota Supreme Court unanimously 
agreed that blood draws in fact require warrants with sufficiently 
particular descriptions of the testing that will be conducted on the 
blood sample.189 This suggests that the court will likely uphold a 
sufficient particularity requirement for blood draw warrants in 
future cases.190 
 186. See id. at 387 (“Moreover, by expressly incorporating the warrant 
application and supporting affidavit into the warrant, the issuing judge limited the 
search of Fawcett’s blood to tests that would reveal ‘evidence of the crime of 
criminal vehicular operation/homicide.’”). 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. See id. at 388–91. 
190. Perhaps the reason the Minnesota Supreme Court was so emphatic about 
characterizing blood draws as searches that require particularity was because the 
United States Supreme Court’s Birchfield decision, decided between the Fawcett 
decisions at the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
had significant implications for the classification of blood draw testing. The 
significance of Birchfield being decided at a point when Fawcett had been decided by 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals but not by the Minnesota Supreme Court is that 
this timing gives an opportunity to see the effect Birchfield had on similar opinions. 
Although decided by different judges with different concerns (the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals is somewhat more concerned with following precedent and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court is more concerned with addressing questions of 
importance in interpreting Minnesota’s law and constitution), the facts in both 
Fawcett decisions did not change. Accordingly, when an individual’s expectation of 
privacy in his or her blood has been recognized at the highest level, courts 
nationwide may become very careful about how they analyze the search of that 
blood, even when there is a valid warrant, in order to make sure that the warrant is 
sufficiently particular in describing the manner in which the blood will be searched 
so that the individual’s expectation of privacy is not violated. 
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2. The Warrant’s Particularity Should Have Been Interpreted from
the Eyes of the Officer Submitting the Affidavit, Who Did Not
Particularly Describe the Presence of Drugs
The United States Supreme Court’s 2016 Birchfield decision 
viewed Minnesota DUI law as a series of warrants, when warrants 
were sought, that dealt with substantially similar sets of facts related 
to drunk driving.191 In fact, the Court found the facts in most 
Minnesota DUI cases to be so similar that they deemed warrants not 
worthwhile and, consequently, unnecessary for breath tests.192 The 
Court differentiated blood draws and testing from breath tests only 
in that blood draws are more physically intrusive in piercing the 
skin193 and cause highly personal information to potentially become 
available to authorities.194 However, although the Court in Birchfield 
held that both the piercing of the skin and the revelation of highly 
personal information to authorities through blood sample testing 
are occurrences that trigger the warrant requirement,195 it remains 
that, like the pre-intrusion facts of blood draw drunk driving cases, 
the facts of breath test drunk driving cases are similar to each other. 
It follows that even in cases where a blood draw is sought instead of 
or in addition to a breath test, the facts are substantially similar from 
one case to the next.196 Thus, warrant-issuing judges are generally 
not expected to read new facts into the pre-intrusion situations when 
analyzing DUI blood draw warrant applications. 
Although the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledges that a 
warrant-issuing judge is not to read new facts into the DUI blood 
draw situation, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in Fawcett that 
the warrant-issuing judge must still review the warrant application 
and draw his or her own independent inferences about the 
situation.197 In reality, however, the warrant-issuing judge in Fawcett 
relied so heavily on the warrant application that the judge “expressly 
incorporate[d] the warrant application and supporting affidavit into 
the warrant.”198 As explained in the United States Supreme Court 
191. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2181 (2016). 
192. See id. at 2181–82. 
193. Id. at 2178. 
194. Id. at 2177. 
195. Id. at 2184. 
196. See supra Section II.B.3. 
197. State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 385 (Minn. 2016). 
198. Id. at 387. 
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case Groh v. Ramirez,199 a reviewing judge may consider warrant 
application materials that accompany and are incorporated into the 
warrant when construing the scope of the warrant.200 Accordingly, 
the warrant’s particularity in Fawcett should have been interpreted 
from the eyes of the detective who applied for the warrant because 
the warrant-issuing judge knowingly deferred to the detective’s 
application materials by incorporating these materials into the 
warrant. Since the warrant application materials heavily emphasized 
that the arresting officers thought Fawcett was drunk and made no 
reference to suspicion of drug use,201 it seems clear that the officer 
applying for the warrant did not suspect the presence of drugs in 
Fawcett’s blood.202 It follows that since the warrant-issuing judge 
relied so heavily on the warrant application materials, and since the 
warrant applicant expressed no suspicion of Fawcett’s drug use, the 
court should have ruled that the warrant did not describe the 
presence of drugs in Fawcett’s blood with sufficient particularity. 
3. The Ruling that the Warrant Was Particular Enough to Justify
the Search of Fawcett’s Blood for the Presence of Drugs Was
Improper and Sets Harmful Precedent
One of the objectionable lessons future Minnesota courts may 
learn from the Fawcett decision is that when a Minnesota warrant is 
interpreted according to what the issuing judge had a substantial 
basis to have reasonably inferred,203 this interpretation is sufficiently 
199. 540 U.S. 551 (2004). 
200. Id. at 557–58. 
201. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 385–86. 
202. In spite of the fact that the detective applying for a warrant made no 
mention of suspecting Fawcett of drug impairment, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
makes a bare assertion to the contrary in its concluding paragraph: “The detective 
in this case was in possession of facts that established probable cause to believe 
evidence of criminal vehicular operation would be found in Fawcett’s blood, 
although he did not know whether the intoxicant was alcohol, controlled 
substances, or a combination of alcohol and controlled substances.” Id. at 387. This 
was the first time in the opinion that the detective’s knowledge was addressed, and 
the court did not further discuss why it thought the detective “did not know whether 
the intoxicant was alcohol, controlled substances, or a combination of alcohol and 
controlled substances.” See id. 
 203. Id. (“[I]t was not unreasonable for the issuing judge to infer that Fawcett’s 
impairment may have been caused by alcohol, controlled substances, or some 
combination of the two.”). The United States Supreme Court has concluded that 
courts can assume a judicial inference of probable cause as long as there is a 
“substantial basis” for that inference. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983). 
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particular in its description204 even when the language of the warrant 
application that has been incorporated into the warrant205 suggests 
a narrower interpretation.206 The problem with the path the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has chosen is in its foundation. The court 
relies on cases that establish the acceptability of judicial inference 
when there is a “substantial basis” for probable cause.207 However, 
these cases do not involve judicial deference to warrant application 
materials through the materials’ incorporation into the warrant.208 
The court attempted to connect the deference it gives to potential 
judicial inferences with an inference that the warrant applicant—a 
detective—might have made about the presence of drugs in 
Fawcett’s blood. This grasp at a link between the warrant-issuing 
judge’s potential inference and the warrant applicant’s potential 
inference seems strained and was not well elaborated.209 
 204. Courts are more inclined to find sufficient particularity in a judge’s warrant 
under the policy that “because the prime function of the warrant requirement is to 
secure ‘an independent assessment of the inferences to be drawn from the available 
evidence,’ it is axiomatic that an issuing judge is not bound by the inferences drawn 
by the officers.” Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 385 (citing State v. Nolting, 254 N.W.2d 340, 
343 (Minn. 1977)). 
205. Id. at 383. 
 206. See, e.g., id. at 385 (“We acknowledge that the warrant application and 
supporting affidavit states that ‘From their investigation, officers formed the belief 
that at the time of the collision . . . Fawcett was the driver and was under the 
influence of alcohol.’”). 
207. State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 1990) (citing Gates, 462 
U.S. at 238–39) (“In reviewing the magistrate’s determination the reviewing court 
must give deference to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause and should 
uphold the determination if there was a ‘substantial basis’ for the magistrate’s 
determination.”). 
 208. See id. (citing Gates and exhibiting no incorporation of warrant application 
materials into the warrant); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 236–39 (citing Jones and 
exhibiting no incorporation of warrant application materials into the warrant); 
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269–72 (1960) (creating the “substantial basis” 
standard, where judicial inference of probable cause is valid if there is a “substantial 
basis” for it, but exhibiting no incorporation of warrant application materials into 
the warrant). 
 209. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 387 (“[T]he detective in this case was in possession 
of facts that established probable cause to believe evidence of criminal vehicular 
operation would be found in Fawcett’s blood, although he did not know whether 
the intoxicant was alcohol, controlled substances, or a combination of alcohol and 
controlled substances.”). As discussed supra note 202, this assertion of the detective’s 
potential inference of the presence of alcohol in Fawcett’s blood is not well 
reasoned, making any potential link between the inferences of the judge and the 
inferences of the detective even more strained. 
38
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 6 [2017], Art. 4
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss6/4
2017] STATE V. FAWCETT 105 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s deference to potential judicial 
inference when the warrant-issuing judge defers to warrant 
application materials210 is harmful. This deference weakens the 
constitutional safeguard of particularity in that what constitutes the 
requisite probable cause has been significantly broadened. Police 
offers can now make generalized statements about an individual’s 
signs of impairment without having to specify whether the 
impairment is caused by alcohol or drugs.211 Officers’ ability to more 
vaguely classify the facts of a traffic stop as evidence of general illegal 
impairment unduly empowers police to more easily obtain a warrant 
and cause an individual’s expectation of privacy to be intruded upon 
through a blood draw and blood testing for an unknown type of 
intoxicant.212 The broader the search in such fishing expeditions, 
the greater the intrusion into the individual’s expectations of 
medical and personal privacy. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court should reverse its holding so 
that Minnesota police can no longer secure warrants in DUI traffic 
stops based on broad hunches that require no further specificity 
than that the individual is suspected of some type of nebulous 
impairment. With nothing but bare hunches, police can too easily 
obtain warrants for blood draws without taking time to critically 
articulate exactly why the blood draw is needed. Fawcett’s 
problematic increase in the accessibility of blood draws is an 
unnecessary infringement on the privacy expectations of individuals 
because sensitive medical and personal information can be easily 
 210. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Fawcett said that it “defer[s] to the issuing 
magistrate.” Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 387. However, the case also makes clear that the 
warrant-issuing judge was deferring to the warrant application by the fact that the 
judge incorporated the warrant application into the warrant by reference. Id. at 383. 
 211. Search Warrant that Permitted Search of Defendant’s Blood for Alcohol or Controlled 
Substances Was Sufficiently Particular, L. OFFICER’S BULL., Sept. 25, 2015, at 9 (“A 
search warrant that permitted the search of a defendant’s blood for alcohol and 
other controlled substances satisfied the particularity requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.”). Knowledge of the Fawcett finding is made readily available to all 
subscribing police forces by this brief synopsis of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
holding in Fawcett, which was written as a guide for the benefit of police officers. See 
id. 
 212. Perhaps a policy of police efficiency is at play. It may be that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court wanted to enable police officers to more easily obtain evidence of 
impairment since, after the recent Birchfield decision, officers’ jobs have become 
more difficult, as they now need a warrant before they can take a blood draw. See 
supra note 75. 
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found in the blood.213 The constitutional safeguard of particularity 
would be properly respected and the individual’s right against 
unreasonable searches would be better protected through a reversal 
of Fawcett. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Fawcett plays a key 
role in evolving national jurisprudence on blood draw testing. First, 
it reaffirms the individual’s expectation of privacy in his or her 
blood. This finding rightly follows the trajectory set by the United 
States Supreme Court in Skinner and more recently in Birchfield. 
Further, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fawcett opinion marks 
the first case the court has decided on the issue of blood draws since 
the United States Supreme Court’s Birchfield decision. The Fawcett 
decision not only carries its own authority as precedent set for the 
state, but it may also become an authoritative reference for how 
courts across the nation utilize Birchfield. Since the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has chosen to interpret Birchfield as a reinstatement 
of reasonable expectations of privacy in an individual’s blood 
sample,214 individuals’ rights will enjoy greater protection. 
Magistrates’ decisions to issue warrants will be analyzed to determine 
their authority to allow blood draws and to allow searches of 
individuals’ blood samples. This recognition of an individual’s 
expectation of privacy in his or her blood is contrary to the findings 
of many other states215 and turns Minnesota itself in a new direction. 
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Fawcett decision has 
also set problematic precedent in the area of warrant interpretation. 
By upholding the importance of a warrant-issuing judge’s 
independent analysis216 when the warrant-issuing judge himself 
deferred to the applying detective’s judgment by incorporating the 
warrant application materials into the warrant, the court has created 
a bizarre result. The way in which the Fawcett decision handled 
 213. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2177 (2016); Skinner v. Ry. 
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989). 
214. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384 n.3. 
215. See supra note 29. 
 216. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 385 (quoting State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 
704 (Minn. 1990)) (“We defer to the issuing magistrate, recognizing that ‘doubtful 
or marginal cases should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded 
to warrants.’”). 
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warrant scrutiny generally217 will likely empower warrant-issuing 
judges to draft broader warrants in the future without fearing that 
warrants will be nullified for lack of particularity or overbreadth. 
When writing their applications and affidavits for search warrants, 
police will likely feel less pressure to describe all items they may 
expect to find in a search. They will have the advantage of knowing 
that warrants will be broadly interpreted to include a wide range of 
inferences that an issuing judge might have made, even if these 
inferences go well beyond the actual language of the warrants. 
Minnesota would benefit if a future Minnesota Supreme Court case 
re-visiting Fawcett would overturn its holding on warrant 
interpretation while upholding the expectation of privacy Fawcett 
acknowledges individuals have in their blood. 
 217. Future Minnesota cases may cite to Fawcett as a case that has expanded the 
degree of deference given to warrant-issuing magistrates, noting that the court 
interpreted the warrant to allow a search for alcohol and drugs even when the 
application and affidavit had only mentioned that officers believed Fawcett was 
under the “influence of alcohol.” Id. at 385. 
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